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INTRODUCTION 
The early twenty-first century has spawned the development and 
growth of crowdfunding, a process in which entrepreneurs raise capital 
from the general public over the Internet.1  Certain crowdfunding 
campaigns, however, constitute securities offerings, triggering 
burdensome disclosure requirements under the Securities Act of 1933 
(the “Securities Act”).2  Namely, crowdfunding campaigns that offer 
investors equity interests must have a registration statement filed with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”).3  Filing a 
registration statement, however, is typically impractical for startup 
companies and small businesses due to the disproportionately high cost, 
the potential for criminal and civil liability, and the potential to miss 
critical market windows due to the lengthy filing process.4 
In an effort to raise the economy from the Great Recession, 
Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the “JOBS 
Act”) in 2012, creating an exemption for certain crowdfunding 
campaigns to offer and sell securities without filing a registration 
statement with the SEC.5  Critics have denounced the crowdfunding 
exemption in the JOBS Act, primarily focusing on the potential for 
securities fraud on the Internet, as well as the inability of investors to 
properly evaluate a company online.6  The JOBS Act tasks the SEC with 
alleviating these concerns through regulatory rules, which must 
implement adequate measures to protect investors.  In November 2013, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See infra Part I.A. 
 2. See infra Part I.C.–D. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See infra Part I.D.2. 
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. See infra Part II.B. 
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the SEC proposed rules to regulate crowdfunding under the JOBS Act.7  
The SEC’s proposal then underwent a period of initial public notice and 
comment, which concluded on February 3, 2013.  At the time of this 
paper’s publication, the proposal awaits further SEC review in light of 
the public comments posted.8 
This Comment suggests that the SEC’s proposed rules require 
crowdfunding entrepreneurs to utilize escrow accounts to adequately 
protect crowdfunding investors.9  The SEC’s current proposal does 
introduce some use of escrow to this effect, but this Comment argues for 
a much more extensive use.10  Specifically, this Comment argues that 
the SEC should require crowdfunding campaign managers to (1) place 
capital contributions into escrow and release them directly to the parties 
responsible for the development or expansion of the business, rather 
than the issuer; (2) maintain capital contributions that exceed a 
crowdfunding campaign’s target offering in escrow, to be paid to 
investors if and when the business fails; and (3) wait one year and offer 
to buy out investors before expending capital contributions that exceed a 
target offering.11 
I. CROWDFUNDING & THE SECURITIES LAWS 
Part I.A. of this Comment explores the mechanics of crowdfunding, 
its unique capacity for raising capital, and its other benefits to startup 
companies and small businesses.  Part I.B. outlines the four models of 
crowdfunding.  Part I.C. sets forth the classification of crowdfunding 
campaigns under the securities laws, describing the way in which 
crowdfunding campaigns may constitute “securities” offerings.  Part 
I.D. describes the constraint that the securities laws place on such 
offerings.  Part I.D.1. illustrates this constraint by looking to a campaign 
that sought to crowdfund a beer company before the SEC shut it down 
for failing to file a registration statement.  Part I.D.2. describes the 
reasons that SEC registration is nonetheless impractical for small 
businesses and startup companies, which might otherwise benefit from 
selling securities through crowdfunding campaigns. 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See infra Part III.B. 
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A. WHAT IS CROWDFUNDING? 
Crowdfunding is a form of microfinance in which a large “crowd” 
of small investors pools together funds in order to provide the necessary 
capital for the development of a startup company or the expansion of a 
small business.12  Crowdfunding campaigns are primarily conducted 
over the Internet, through dedicated crowdfunding-platform websites 
called “portals.”13  Through crowdfunding portals, the general public 
gains the capacity to fully fund a commercial project or social cause.14  
Crowdfunding thus provides an unprecedented source of capital to 
startup companies and small businesses, which otherwise face difficulty 
obtaining capital investments from traditional lenders due to their 
heightened risk or uniqueness.15  Crowdfunding disperses the risks 
associated with investing in startup companies and small businesses 
amongst a large crowd of small investors, providing entrepreneurs with 
large sums of capital without requiring any individual investor to bear a 
large capital risk.16 
Recent statistics demonstrate both the fundraising capacity and 
rapid growth of crowdfunding in recent years.17  In 2010, companies and 
individuals raised $890 million through crowdfunding portals.18  In 
2011, the number jumped 64% to $1.47 billion.19  In 2012, the number 
spiked another 81% to $2.66 billion.20  In 2013, crowdfunding portals 
are projected to facilitate $5.1 billion in fundraising, a 91.7% increase 
over the prior year.21 
In one of 2012’s standout crowdfunding campaigns, Pebble 
Technology raised over $10 million through Kickstarter, a North 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Peter C. Sumners, Crowdfunding America’s Small Businesses After the JOBS 
Act of 2012, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 38, 38 (2012). 
 13. Id. at 40. 
 14. Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the Economy, 
FORBES (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is-
crowdfunding-and-how-does-it-benefit-the-economy/. 
 15. Sumners, supra note 12, at 38. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See generally Kylie Maclellan, Global Crowdfunding Volumes Rise 81 Percent 
in 2012, REUTERS (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/08/us-
crowdfunding-data-idUSBRE9370QY20130408. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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American crowdfunding portal, to finance the development of the 
“Pebble” smartwatch.22  Pebble Technology’s founder, Eric Migicovsky, 
had already worked on a successful smartwatch that is compatible with 
the Blackberry, and then wanted to develop the Pebble for use with the 
iPhone and Android.23  Despite his prior success, Migicovsky failed to 
secure funding from venture capitalists or angel investors, so he turned 
to Kickstarter to raise funds from the crowd.24  Migicovsky began the 
Pebble’s Kickstarter campaign with a $100,000 target,25 which he 
planned to reach by selling pre-orders of the Pebble for $115, at a $35 
discount off the retail price of $150.26  Migicovsky’s Kickstarter 
campaign also offered the Pebble in colors other than black for $125, as 
well as a two-for-$220 deal.27 
The Pebble’s Kickstarter campaign reached its $100,000 target 
within its first two hours.28  Only twelve hours into the campaign, 
Migicovsky had raised over $500,000,29 and by the end of day three, 
Migicovsky had raised $2,656,389 from 18,867 people.30  By the time 
the Kickstarter campaign finally concluded after ninety days, 
Migicovsky had pre-sold 85,000 Pebble smartwatches, raising 
$10,266,845 from a crowd of 68,929 people.31  As of November 6, 2013, 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id. 
 23. Deborah Netburn, Pebble Smartwatch Raises $4.7 million On Kickstarter 
FundingSite, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2012/apr/18/business/la-fi-tn-pebble-smart-watch-kickstarter-20120418. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Maclellan, supra note 17, at 1. 
 26. Netburn, supra note 23, at 1–2. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Gillian Shaw, Vancouver-Born Entrepreneur’s Pebble Smartphone Breaks 
Kickstarter Record, THE VANCOUVER SUN (Apr. 16, 2012), 
http://blogs.vancouversun.com/2012/04/16/vancouver-born-entrepreneurs-pebble-
smartphone-breaks-kickstarter-record/. 
 30. Anthony Wing Kosner, Pebble Watch for iPhone and Android, The Most 
Successful Kickstarter Project Ever, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonykosner/2012/04/15/pebble-watch-for-iphone-and-
android-the-most-successful-kickstarter-project-ever/. 
 31. Pebble Technology, Pebble: E-Paper Watch for iPhone and Android, 
KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/597507018/pebble-e-paper-watch-
for-iphone-and-android (last visited Dec. 10, 2013) (Pebble technologies has “gone 
from a tiny, 11-person outfit trying to deliver promised smartwatches to its Kickstarter 
backers to a growing 40-person business looking to cement its role as a serious player 
in wearable technology”). 
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Pebble Technologies has sold 190,000 Pebble smartwatches and nearly 
quadrupled its staff.32 
In addition to its fundraising capacity, crowdfunding also offers 
startup companies and small businesses a number of other benefits.33  
Notably, crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to hedge risk by gaining 
market validation and avoiding equity sales before fully bringing a 
product to the market.34  Additionally, crowdfunding campaigns are 
powerful marketing tools.35  They have online profiles that may 
introduce a venture’s mission and vision, and drive referral traffic 
through social media mechanisms incorporated within crowdfunding 
portal sites.36  Crowdfunding campaigns also provide entrepreneurs with 
comments, feedback, and ideas from the crowd.37  Thus, crowdfunding 
not only provides entrepreneurs with capital, but also helps prepare them 
to meet the demands of the market awaiting them.38 
B. THE FOUR MODELS OF CROWDFUNDING 
Four basic models of crowdfunding have emerged: (i) the donation 
model, (ii) the reward model, (iii) the pre-purchase model, and (iv) the 
equity model.39  Under the donation model, individuals give capital to a 
startup company, small business, or charity with no expectation of 
repayment in any form.40  Under the reward model, investors make 
capital contributions in return for a reward, which may include any 
commodity, service, or even mere recognition.41  Under the pre-purchase 
model, investors make capital contributions in return for a product that 
is under development, to be received if and when the startup company 
developing the product successfully launches.  If the project fails 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Ina Fried, With 190,000 Smartwatches Sold, Pebble Boosts iPhone Support, 
ALL THINGS D (Nov. 6, 2013), http://allthingsd.com/20131106/with-190000-
smartwatches-sold-pebble-boosts-iphone-support/. 
 33. See Tanya Prive, Top 10 Benefits of Crowdfunding, FORBES (Oct. 12, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/10/12/top-10-benefits-of-crowdfunding-
2/. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Sumners, supra note 12, at 40. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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though, these investors do not receive the product and might even lose 
their investment.42  Finally, the equity model of crowdfunding (“equity-
based crowdfunding”) gives investors actual equity ownership in a 
company in exchange for their capital contributions.43 
Of the $2.7 billion in capital that was raised through crowdfunding 
portals in 2012, equity-based crowdfunding accounted for only $116 
million.44  Lending sites that sell debt45 accounted for $1.2 billion, and 
the remaining $1.4 billion went toward ventures offering non-financial 
rewards or collecting donations.46  Equity-based crowdfunding is 
expected to increase once the SEC adopts rules that enable it under 
appropriate regulation.47 
C. CROWDFUNDING UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT 
Equity-based crowdfunding has thus far been trailing behind other 
models of crowdfunding,48 but this is because securities laws have 
essentially precluded this model.49  The Securities Act mandates that any 
entity that sells or offers to sell or purchase a security across state lines 
must file a registration statement with the SEC.50  Accordingly, the offer 
or sale of a security through a crowdfunding portal must be “registered” 
with the SEC, absent an applicable exemption from the Securities Act’s 
registration requirement.51  Filing a registration statement, however, is 
typically impractical for small business ventures.52  Therefore, startup 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Maclellan, supra note 17. 
 45. Debt-based crowdfunding, which may also constitute a securities offering, is 
beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Sumners, supra note 12, at 42–43.  The JOBS Act amends securities laws to 
facilitate crowdfunding.  This topic is discussed in the following section. See infra Part 
II.C.1. 
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012). 
 51. Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: 
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 907 (2011).  A 
comprehensive review of the various exemptions set forth under the Securities Act is 
beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 52. See id. at 910. 
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companies and small businesses that wish to offer securities through 
crowdfunding portals have been hindered by the Securities Act.53 
1. Equity-Based Crowdfunding Campaigns as “Securities” Offerings 
As a threshold matter, equity-based crowdfunding campaigns are 
subject to the Securities Act’s registration requirement because they 
constitute interstate offers and sales of “securities.”54  The Securities Act 
specifically defines a “security” to include numerous financial 
instruments, including an “investment contract.”55  In SEC v. Howey, the 
Supreme Court interpreted an “investment contract” under the Securities 
Act to include any (i) investment of money, (ii) with an expectation of 
profit, (iii) in a common enterprise, (iv) predominantly dependent upon 
the efforts of others.56 
In SEC v. Howey, W.J. Howey Co. sold investors real property 
interests in Florida orange groves, as well as service contracts for the 
cultivation and development of the groves,57 in exchange for a share in 
the groves’ profits.58  The Supreme Court held that W.J. Howey Co. was 
not merely offering and selling land contracts together with service 
contracts.59  Rather, the company was offering the opportunity to (i) 
invest money by purchasing land and service contracts, (ii) in a common 
enterprise of orange grove cultivation and development, where investors 
notably did not have physical access to their individual plots within the 
orange groves, (iii) with an expectation of profit for the investors, to be 
collected from the shared profits of the orange groves, (iv) that 
predominantly depended upon the efforts of other (i.e., the groves’ 
cultivators and developers who were parties to the service contracts).60  
Accordingly, W.J. Howey Co. was offering securities in the form of 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. at 904 (“[I]t is probable that a court would find that crowdfunding interests 
that include a financial return are investment contracts.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b 
(classifying “investment contracts” as a form of “securities” under the Securities Act); 
see also SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300–01 (1946) (defining “investment 
contracts” under the Securities Act). 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). 
 56. Howey, 328 U.S. at 300–01. 
 57. Id. at 295–96. 
 58. Id. at 299. 
 59. Id. at 299–300. 
 60. Id. 
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“investment contracts” under the Securities Act.61  The Supreme Court, 
therefore, held that W.J. Howey Co. had violated the Securities Act by 
offering and selling securities without filing an accompanying 
registration statement with the SEC.62 
SEC v. Howey thus sets forth four criteria for an investment 
contract,63 and the application of this standard to equity-based 
crowdfunding campaigns is mostly straightforward.64  Investments in 
equity-based crowdfunding campaigns involve an (i) investment of 
money—the purchase of equity,65 with (ii) an expectation of profit—the 
expected increase in the value of the purchased equity66 that (iii) 
predominantly depends upon the efforts of others—the members of the 
operating entity in which the equity is held.67  The common enterprise 
criterion for an investment contract security, as interpreted by SEC v. 
Howey, however, warrants closer scrutiny.68 
The Supreme Court has not defined a “common enterprise,” but 
federal appellate courts have adopted three distinct standards for the 
commonality of an enterprise.69  The narrowest standard requires 
“horizontal commonality,” the gathering of investors’ assets in one 
common investment fund.70  Legal scholars disagree whether such 
horizontal commonality was actually present in SEC v. Howey.71  The 
predominant view is that horizontal commonality was indeed present, 
even though investors purchased distinct land contracts, because the 
“profit-generating scheme” relied upon these contracts in the aggregate. 
72  In other words, the success of an investment depended upon the 
success of the entire grove, rather than an individual tract of land.73  A 
minority view exists among scholars, however, that horizontal 
commonality was absent in SEC v. Howey because investors purchased 
distinct tracts of land, and this distinction simply fails to constitute a 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 300–01. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 51, at 901–04. 
 65. Id. at 901. 
 66. Id. at 902–03. 
 67. Id. at 903–04. 
 68. See generally id. at 901–02. 
 69. See id. at 887. 
 70. See, e.g., Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 638 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D. 
Mass. 1985) aff’d, 793 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986). 
 71. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 51, at 887, n.37. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. 
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common pooling of assets in a single investment fund.74  Under this 
view, the fact that the success of the venture depended upon the tracts in 
the aggregate is simply insufficient to render the venture a common 
enterprise.75 
The Ninth Circuit applies a less restrictive standard, requiring 
“strict vertical commonality” to constitute a common enterprise.76  Strict 
vertical commonality requires the success of an investment in an 
operating entity to be proportionate to the success of the entity itself; the 
gain or loss incurred by the investor must be proportionate to the gain or 
loss incurred by the operating entity.77  However, the Ninth Circuit is the 
only Circuit to adopt this standard.78  Other Circuits apply a third, less 
restrictive standard, requiring “broad vertical commonality” to constitute 
a common enterprise.79  This highly flexible standard requires the gain 
or loss incurred by an investor in an operating entity to be dependent 
upon the efforts of the operating entity.80  The gain or loss of investors 
need not be proportionate to a gain or loss of the operating entity, 
however, and thus the operating entity need not share in the gain or loss 
of investors whatsoever.81 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See id. (citing James D. Gordon III, Defining A Common Enterprise in 
Investment Contracts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 59, 73 (2011)). 
 75. See id. 
 76. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482, n.7 (9th Cir. 
1973) (“A common enterprise is one in which the fortunes of the investor are 
interwoven with and dependent upon the efforts and success of those seeking the 
investment or of third parties.”); see also Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 51, at 888 
(noting that the standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit has been coined “strict vertical 
commonality”). 
 77. See Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d at 482 n.7; see also Heminway & 
Hoffman, supra note 51, at 888 (“[St]rict vertical commonality requires a link between 
investment performance and promoter remuneration.”). 
 78. Christopher L. Borsani, A “Common” Problem: Examining the Need for 
Common Ground in the “Common Enterprise” Element of the Howey Test, 10 DUQ. 
BUS. L.J. 1, 10 (2008). 
 79. See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(creating the broad vertical commonality standard); see also SEC v. ETS Payphones, 
Inc. 408 F.3d 727, 732 (11th Cir. 2005) (adopting the broad commonality standard). 
 80. ETS Payphones, 408 F.3d at 732 (“[T]he requisite commonality is evidenced 
by the fact that the fortunes of all investors are inextricably tied to the efficacy of the 
[operating entity].”). 
 81. See id. 
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Investments in equity-based crowdfunding campaigns typically 
satisfy each of the three judicial standards for a common enterprise.82  
Horizontal commonality is always satisfied because the pooling of funds 
is the “essence” of any crowdfunding campaign, equity-based or 
otherwise.83  The success of investors in a crowdfunding campaign 
depends upon the collective contributions of all investors in the 
campaign, rather than any individual participant, satisfying the liberal, 
majority-view of horizontal commonality.84  Even the stricter minority-
view of horizontal commonality is satisfied because all investors in a 
crowdfunding campaign contribute capital to one common fund.85 
Additionally, strict vertical commonality is generally satisfied in 
equity-based crowdfunding campaigns because the success of investors 
is generally proportionate to the success of the operating entity, insofar 
as increases or decreases in the value of equity sold to investors are 
proportionate to increases or decreases in the value of the equity held by 
the entity.86  If the operating entity does not own any of its own equity 
though, then strict vertical commonality will in fact be absent in this 
scenario because investors may incur a gain or loss while the entity does 
not.87  Finally, broad vertical commonality is satisfied in equity-based 
crowdfunding campaigns because the success of investors depends upon 
the efforts of the operating entity.88  Therefore, equity-based 
crowdfunding campaigns will almost always constitute common 
enterprises, in addition to satisfying each of SEC v. Howey’s other 
criteria for securities in the form of “investment contracts.”89 
D. HOW SEC REGISTRATION CONSTRAINS EQUITY-BASED 
CROWDFUNDING 
Insofar as equity-based crowdfunding campaigns constitute sales 
and offers of investment contract “securities” under SEC v. Howey,”90 
the additional fact that crowdfunding campaigns are conducted over the 
Internet (i.e., across state lines) subjects them to the Securities Act’s 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 51, at 901–02. 
 83. See id. at 901. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. at 901–02. 
 88. See id. at 901. 
 89. Id. at 902–03. 
 90. Id.; see also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300–01 (1946). 
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registration requirement.91  A recent example demonstrates that the 
Securities Act may thus apply to equity-based crowdfunding 
campaigns.92  In November of 2009, advertising executives Michael 
Migliozzi II and Brian William Flatow began a crowdfunding campaign 
on their own portal website, BuyaBeerCompany.com, seeking to raise 
$300 million in order to purchase Pabst Brewing Company (“PBR”).93  
The campaign offered investors a “crowdsourced certificate of 
ownership” and the value of their investment in beer.94 
1. The Campaign to Crowdfund Pabst Brewing Company 
At the time, PBR was owned by a private charitable trust, which 
had been seeking a buyer for the company.95  However, the attorney 
representing Migliozzi and Flatow stated that the two were merely 
conducting an experiment.96  Nonetheless, the campaign raised $14.75 
million during its first three weeks, and on February 22, 2010, Migliozzi 
and Flatow issued a press release announcing that 
BuyaBeerCompany.com had received over $200 million in pledges from 
over five million investors.97  On March 15, 2010, an article in The 
Daily Deal announced that Migliozzi and Flatow had retained an 
attorney, planned to incorporate Buy a Beer Company LLC, and 
intended to issue investors stock in the corporation instead of a 
certificate of ownership.98  The SEC shut down BuyaBeerCompany.com 
for selling securities without filing a registration statement with the 
SEC, violating Section 5 of the Securities Act.99  Migliozzi and Flatow 
                                                                                                                 
 91. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012). 
 92. C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012). 
 93. Migliozzi, Securities Act Release No. 9216 (June 8, 2011), available at 2011 
WL 2246317, 1 [hereinafter Migliozzi, Cease-and-Desist Order] (Order Instituting 
Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933, 
Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order). 
 94. Id. at 2. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Bradford, supra note 92, at 6. 
 97. Migliozzi, Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 93, at 2. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 3; 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012) (criminalizing the offer or sale of securities 
without filing a registration statement, as well as creating a private cause of action). 
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entered into a settlement agreement with the SEC, avoiding further 
penalties.100 
Similarly, under SEC v. Howey, the Securities Act requires all 
equity-based crowdfunding campaigns to file registration statements 
with the SEC, absent an applicable exemption.101  Filing a registration 
statement is typically impractical for startup companies and small 
businesses—the ventures that stand to benefit most from equity-based 
crowdfunding.102  This impracticality is due to (i) the disproportionately 
high cost of drafting and filing a registration statement; (ii) the exposure 
to criminal and civil liability that accompanies filing a registration 
statement; and (iii) the opportunity costs borne by the lengthy process of 
filing a registration statement.103 
2. The Cost, Liability, and Operating Risk Associated with SEC 
Registration 
First, the costs associated with drafting and filing a registration 
statement include: (i) underwriter fees; (ii) SEC filing fees; (iii) legal 
fees; (iv) accounting fees; (v) printing and engraving costs; (vi) a 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority filing fee; (vii) electronic filing 
fees, if applicable; and (viii) transfer agent and registrar fees, if a third 
party handles the issuer’s stock records.104  Completing a registration 
statement for a small business therefore costs over $100,000 in third 
party services alone, in addition to valuable time expended by senior 
management in preparing a registration statement and marketing an 
offering.105  The cost of drafting and filing a registration statement is 
thus disproportionately high relative to the total yield of an offering of 
securities to the public (a “public offering”) by a small business.106 
Second, filing a registration statement and engaging in a public 
offering expose an issuer to a wide range of both civil and criminal 
liability.107  Under Section 11 of the Securities Act, an issuer is civilly 
liable to investors if the issuer’s registration statement contains a false 
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statement of material fact or is materially misleading.108  Under Section 
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, an issuer is civilly liable to investors if the 
prospectus in the issuer’s registration statement, or an oral 
communication regarding an offering, asserts a false statement of 
material fact or is materially misleading.109  Under Section 12(a)(1) of 
the Securities Act, an issuer is civilly liable to investors if the issuer 
offers or sells securities without filing a registration statement 
altogether,110 as well as criminally liable under Section 5 of the 
Securities Act.111  Under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, an issuer is 
also subject to SEC enforcement if the issuer engages in any fraudulent 
conduct relating to an offer or sale of securities, irrespective of the 
existence or contents of a registration statement.112  Beyond the scope of 
the Securities Act, issuers also face liability for securities fraud under 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “34 Act”),113 
as well as under Rule 10b-5 of the 34 Act.114 
Third, the lengthy process of drafting and filing a registration 
statement may cause an issuer to miss “market windows” (i.e., passing 
favorable market conditions).115  Drafting and filing a registration 
statement usually takes a minimum of several months.116  This extended 
time period may cause issuers to miss important, passing financing 
opportunities in the market, due to the fact that a registration statement 
is pending approval by the SEC or not yet completed by the issuer.117  
Missing such market windows could bankrupt a small business that 
absorbs the cost of filing a registration statement with the expectation of 
capitalizing on these unique opportunities in the market.118 
The Securities Act’s registration requirement has thus served to 
preclude equity-based crowdfunding campaigns by startup companies 
and small businesses.119  The costs of drafting and filing a registration 
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statement are simply prohibitively expensive.120  Yet, even if these costs 
were not out of reach, filing a registration statement nonetheless opens 
the doors to a slew of criminal and civil liability.121  Additionally, the 
lengthy process of filing a registration statement may cause issuers to 
miss critical market windows, bankrupting businesses that have 
expended the necessary resources to file a registration statement.122  
Therefore, the costs of filing a registration statement typically outweigh 
the benefits (i.e.. raising capital by offering and selling securities to the 
public) for a startup company or small business.123 
II. CROWDFUNDING UNDER THE JOBS ACT  
Part II.A. of this Comment outlines the exemption from registration 
that the JOBS Act applies to crowdfunding campaigns.  Part II.B. 
presents the criticism of this exemption.  Part II.B.1. describes the way 
in which fraudulent securities were offered over the Internet under Rule 
504, and Part II.B.2. describes the fear of similar fraud under the JOBS 
Act.  Part II.B.3. addresses the concerns over the hidden identities of 
crowdfunding campaign managers. Part II.B.4. presents what some 
critics view as the room for increased, rather than relaxed, regulation of 
crowdfunding campaigns. 
A. THE JOBS ACT: TITLE III 
In response to the deep economic recession that began in 2008, 
Congress sought to stimulate the growth of startup companies by 
providing business entrepreneurs with wider access to investment 
capital.124  Specifically, Congress aimed to facilitate the nascent use of 
equity-based crowdfunding by creating a new exemption from the 
Securities Act’s registration requirements.125  Congress set forth this 
exemption in Title III of the JOBS Act, which permits startup companies 
to sell up to $1,000,000 in securities per twelve-month period, through a 
registered crowdfunding-portal or broker-dealer, without filing a 
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registration statement with the SEC.126  Instead of filing a registration 
statement, startup companies and small businesses offering exempt 
securities under Title III need only provide investors with information 
that explains the nature of the security being offered and the risks with 
which it is associated.127  In addition to this relaxed regulation, the JOBS 
Act further incentivizes startup companies and small businesses to 
utilize equity-based crowdfunding by requiring investors to hold 
securities purchased via crowdfunding portals for a minimum of one 
year before selling.128 
While Title III of the JOBS Act thus relaxes the regulation of 
securities offered through crowdfunding portals, the provision 
correspondingly provides a measure of investor protection, restricting 
the dollar amount that individuals may invest in such unregistered 
securities per twelve-month period.129  Individual investors with an 
annual income or net worth under $100,000 may invest up to the greater 
of $2,000 or 5% of their annual income or net worth.130  Individual 
investors with an annual income or net worth at or above $100,000 may 
invest up to 10% of their annual income or net worth, but no more than 
$100,000.131  In addition to these caps on individual investments, the 
JOBS Act offers further protection to investors in crowdfunding 
campaigns by requiring companies offering exempt securities under 
Title III to nonetheless comply with any future regulatory rules adopted 
by the SEC.132 
On April 5, 2012, President Barack Obama signed The JOBS Act 
into law,133 commencing a 270-day time period for the SEC to propose 
regulatory rules that enact the legislation while duly protecting 
investors.134  On October 23, 2013, the SEC finally voted, unanimously, 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(a), 
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to propose rules implementing Title III of the JOBS Act.135  The SEC’s 
proposed rules were published in the Federal Register on November 5, 
2013,136 roughly ten months after the original deadline.137  The SEC’s 
proposed rules then opened to public comment for a period of ninety 
days, which concluded on February 3, 2014.138  The SEC must now 
review the public comments and determine whether to adopt or amend 
the proposed rules.139  At the time of this Comment’s publication, this 
review and subsequent determination are still pending. 
B. CRITICISM OF THE JOBS ACT  
Various critics have opposed the crowdfunding exemption in Title 
III of the JOBS Act.140  The capacity to utilize crowdfunding for fraud 
has driven much of the criticism, which is natural in light of the 
Securities Act’s focus on protecting investors from fraud.141  Section 7 
of the Securities Act prohibits fraud, false statements of material fact, 
and material omissions in a registration statement.142  Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Act and Rule 10b-5 of the 34 Act further prohibits fraud, 
false statements of material fact, and material omissions in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities, even beyond the statements 
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within a registration statement.143  Yet, in spite of these laws, the 
Internet has nonetheless been widely utilized to engage in securities 
fraud,144 so much so that the SEC created a web page dedicated to 
educating investors about online fraud well before Congress passed the 
JOBS Act.145  Critics of the JOBS Act thus view Title III’s 
crowdfunding exemption as opening the door to unprecedented levels of 
securities fraud on the Internet, by removing the measure of investor 
protection afforded by the filing of an issuer’s registration statement 
with the SEC.146 
1. Fraudulent Securities Offered Under Rule 504 
Critics of Title III’s crowdfunding exemption who fear that it will 
lead to fraud look to the history of Rule 504 under the Securities Act.147  
As originally drafted, Rule 504 provided an exemption from registration 
for non-public companies offering $500,000 or less in securities.148  In 
fact, Rule 504 originally had no specific disclosure requirements 
whatsoever.149  Rather, Rule 504 only prohibited an issuer from 
engaging in the general solicitation of investors, unless an issuer’s 
offering satisfied state law disclosure requirements.150  Rule 504, 
however, lacked any restrictions on secondary trading, which is the 
resale of securities by an investor.151  Therefore, as the Internet became 
more widely utilized for securities offerings, fraudsters took advantage 
of Rule 504’s exemption to engage in fraudulent offerings of exempt 
securities on the secondary market.152 
In response, the SEC amended Rule 504 by restricting secondary 
trades of exempt securities under Rule 504, in addition to its original 
restriction on general solicitation, unless such securities comply with the 
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disclosure requirements of at least one state.153  This amendment 
removed the opportunity for the general public to invest in unregistered 
Rule 504 offerings that do not comply with any state law’s disclosure 
requirements.154  Critics of the JOBS Act therefore fear that scammers 
will take advantage of Title III’s exemption in order to defraud the 
general investing public, just as they took advantage of Rule 504’s 
exemption before it was amended to remove that opportunity.155 
2. The Opportunity for Fraud in Crowdfunding 
Critics who fear that Title III’s crowdfunding exemption will lead 
to fraud are not cooled by the provision’s cap on individual 
investment.156  First, critics argue that the cap will not deter fraudsters, 
who can collect small investments of $250 to $500 from myriad 
investors.157  Second, critics argue that the defrauding of many small 
investors deserves as much protection as the defrauding of a few large 
investors.158  Even though Title III’s investment caps limit each 
individual investor’s exposure to risk, critics argue that this limitation 
does not justify an exemption from filing a registration statement 
without substantially meaningful disclosure.159  Critics point out that 
small investors may be least able to bear the risk of an investment in a 
speculative business.160  Therefore, critics find that Title III’s cap on 
individual investment will neither deter scammers nor sufficiently 
protect investors in crowdfunding campaigns.161 
3. The Masked Identities of Crowdfunding Campaign Managers 
In addition to their capacity for fraud, crowdfunding campaigns 
have also been criticized for masking the identities of even legitimate 
business owners anonymously raising capital on the Internet.162  David 
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M. Cromwell, Adjunct Professor of Entrepreneurship at Yale School of 
Management and former head of the venture capital investment business 
at JPMorgan, posted in a public comment upon the SEC’s proposed 
rules implementing Title III of the JOBS Act: 
The Crowd Funding concept is not going to work.  Small investors 
will lose all their money most of the time, not many extra new 
ventures will start up and succeed, and only a few new jobs will be 
created on a sustained basis. 
Authors of the legislation clearly do not understand successful 
venture capital investing and the key success factor.  The key 
consideration is the management ability of [the] management team 
behind the idea, not the idea itself.  Can the founders / entrepreneurs 
make the idea happen, can they execute the business plan?  This is a 
tough decision to make and requires a lot of exposure to the 
management team. 
Incompetent management causes more failures in new business 
ventures than all of the other reasons, combined. . . . 
As [a] venture investor, you cannot judge the abilities of the 
management team over the Internet.  Real venture capitalists do not 
make their investments over the Internet—they spend hours and 
hours interviewing the founders / management team, in person.  
Small investors cannot successfully invest over the Internet, 
either.163 
In short, Cromwell argues that crowdfunding campaigns fail to 
allow investors to make properly informed decisions because investors 
cannot evaluate the management team leading a crowdfunding 
campaign, and that this is the key consideration in a venture 
investment.164 
4. The Room for Increased Regulation of Crowdfunding Campaigns 
Some critics of the JOBS Act not only oppose Title III’s 
crowdfunding exemption, but also argue that crowdfunding campaigns 
should be subject to heightened disclosure requirements.165  As a 
baseline, crowdfunding campaigns rely upon general solicitation, which 
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invites more unsophisticated investors who are in need of the protections 
normally provided by the Securities Act.166  But some critics go further, 
arguing that crowdfunding campaigns warrant even greater disclosure 
due to the impersonal nature of the Internet, which limits the available 
information about a company to that which the company itself posts on 
the portal website hosting its crowdfunding campaign.167 
III. HOW ESCROW MAY PROTECT CROWDFUNDING INVESTORS  
Escrow accounts may be used to protect investors in crowdfunding 
campaigns against fraud, as well as to mitigate the overall risk of 
investing in a startup company or small business168.  This Comment 
recommends that the SEC adopt the use of escrow accounts to these 
effects in its rules that regulate Title III of the JOBS Act.169  The SEC’s 
proposed rules do in fact incorporate some use of escrow accounts in 
order to protect crowdfunding investors against fraud.170  This 
Comment, however, argues for a much more extensive use of escrow 
accounts than that embraced by the SEC’s current proposal.171 
Part III.A. outlines the use of escrow in the SEC’s current proposed 
rulemaking.  Part III.B. explains the shortcomings of this use in 
adequately protecting investors.  Part III.B.1. therefore recommends that 
the SEC require crowdfunding campaign managers to keep 
crowdfunding contributions in escrow after the conclusion of a 
campaign, to be distributed to the third parties responsible for the 
development of the business.  Part III.B.2. further recommends a 
requirement for campaign managers to keep crowdfunding contributions 
that exceed a target offering in escrow for shareholder security.  Finally, 
Part III.B.3. recommends that campaign managers only be permitted to 
expend crowdfunding contributions that exceed a target offering if they 
wait at least one year and first offer to repurchase shares from investors. 
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A. THE USE OF ESCROW IN THE CURRENT SEC PROPOSAL 
The SEC’s proposed rules require crowdfunding portals to transfer 
all contributions to a crowdfunding campaign into an escrow account, 
which may only release the funds to the issuer that is operating the 
campaign if and when the issuer’s target offering is met or exceeded.172  
If an issuer fails to raise funds equal to, or greater than, their target 
offering by the conclusion of a crowdfunding campaign, then the escrow 
account must return all contributions to their respective investors.173  
The SEC explains that this use of escrow aims to prevent fraud upon 
either issuers or investors.174  Specifically, the proposal’s use of escrow 
prevents crowdfunding portals from stealing investor contributions from 
issuers that have met or exceeded their target offerings, as well as from 
investors who are due the return of their investment if and when a target 
offering is not met by the conclusion of a crowdfunding campaign.175 
B. THE NEED FOR FURTHER USE OF ESCROW 
Indeed, the SEC is on the right track in recognizing the value of 
escrow accounts in the context of crowdfunding.176  Namely, escrow 
accounts ensure that capital is received by its intended beneficiaries.  
This is particularly valuable to businesses and investors trading 
securities in startup companies and small businesses through 
intermediary websites on the Internet.  However, the use of escrow 
accounts set forth in the SEC’s proposal ceases upon the meeting of, or 
the failure to meet, a target offering.177  Thus, the use of escrow accounts 
in the SEC’s proposal only protects against fraud for the duration of a 
crowdfunding campaign.178  But if and when a successful campaign 
reaches its target, and contributions are released from escrow, the issuer 
then takes full control over the assets.179  This Comment argues for the 
use of escrow beyond this point, in order to protect investors after a 
crowdfunding campaign has concluded and a crowdfunding portal is no 
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longer being employed as an intermediary.  The use of escrow accounts 
after the conclusion of a crowdfunding campaign may protect investors 
from future fraud by the issuer, as well as mitigate the overall risk of 
crowdfunding investment. 
1. The Need to Keep Funds in Escrow After the Conclusion of a 
Campaign 
First, a target offering should not be released from escrow directly 
to an issuer when a crowdfunding campaign meets its target, as the 
SEC’s current proposal mandates.180  Rather, the capital should be 
released from escrow directly to the parties necessary for the planned 
development or expansion of the business.  This would require 
crowdfunding entrepreneurs to clearly state the intended purpose of the 
capital raised from a campaign, as well as the parties intended to realize 
that purpose.  When funds are released from escrow to these parties, 
rather than an issuer, it prevents issuers from defrauding investors 
altogether, absconding with their contributions after the conclusion of a 
crowdfunding campaign.  If the issuer decides to change the course of 
action for the initial funds received from the target offering, they should 
be required to get the consent of each investor or return their investment.  
Otherwise, issuers could tell investors that they are investing in a 
venture with a given plan, and then issuers could change that plan after 
the conclusion of the campaign, misleading investors entirely. 
For example, if an entrepreneur operates a crowdfunding campaign 
in order to raise capital necessary for services such as industrial design, 
manufacturing, or advertising, then the capital raised from the campaign 
should be released from escrow directly to the third parties responsible 
for providing these services.  If the capital is necessary to hire internal 
employees, then the funds should be released from escrow directly to the 
employees.  If a business decides to use crowdfunded capital for a 
purpose other than that stated in the crowdfunding campaign, however, 
then the business must get the consent of each investor or return their 
investment. 
The measure of protection afforded by this proposed use of escrow 
is indeed limited by the opportunity for businesses to defraud investors 
by paying false employees or service providers.  Crowdfunding 
campaign managers may falsify employment records or service 
contracts, and create shell bank accounts to receive funds from escrow.  
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This opportunity for fraud will likely be seldom recognized, however, 
because crowdfunding entrepreneurs typically do not engage in 
crowdfunding campaigns in order to hire employees.181  They certainly 
may, but this is simply not the typical scenario.  Further, even if 
crowdfunding entrepreneurs do have the aim to hire employees with 
crowdfunded capital, it would be slightly more difficult to defraud 
investors by paying false employees than if the capital were released 
directly to the issuers. 
2. The Need to Keep Contributions Exceeding a Target Offering in 
Escrow 
Second, escrow accounts may further protect crowdfunding 
investors against fraud and the overall risk of investing in a startup 
company182 by requiring crowdfunding entrepreneurs to maintain in 
escrow capital contributions that exceed a campaign’s target.  The SEC 
should require that these contributions are kept in escrow after the 
conclusion of a crowdfunding campaign, and released to investors, in 
proportion to their investment, if and when the business fails.  This use 
of escrow mitigates the overall risk of investment, allowing investors to 
recover part or all of their investment if the business fails.  This use of 
escrow also prevents issuers from defrauding investors of campaign 
contributions that exceed a target offering. 
For example, if a crowdfunding campaign has a $100,000 target 
and raises $200,000, then $100,000 must be kept in escrow after the 
conclusion of the campaign.  In this scenario, if the business fails 
completely, investors will recover the full value of their investment, 
even though they will not see any profits.  Naturally, this measure of 
protection has its limits.  For example, if a crowdfunding campaign has 
a $100,000 target and raises $125,000, then investors will only recover 
25% of their original investment.  Further, if the campaign meets its 
target but does not exceed it, then if and when the business fails, 
investors will not recover any of their investment. 
This use of escrow indeed constrains the flexibility of a business’s 
capital expenditure, but this is not devastating to crowdfunding 
entrepreneurs.  Crowdfunding entrepreneurs set targets that represent the 
capital necessary for the planned development or expansion of a 
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business.  Therefore, if a business raises this necessary capital, it is not 
unreasonable to require the business to keep excess capital, which is not 
required for the planned development or expansion, in escrow for the 
protection of investors. 
3. Criteria for Spending Contributions Exceeding a Target Offering 
Third, if a business seeks to expend any capital from the pool of 
capital contributions that exceed a target offering, which must otherwise 
be kept in escrow as shareholder security, then the business should be 
required to satisfy two threshold criteria.  First, the business should be 
required to wait at least one year before expending capital that exceeds 
the target offering, just as investors must wait one year before selling 
their shares under the JOBS Act.183  Second, the business should be 
required notify all investors of the plan to spend the excess capital, 
which is shareholder security, and offer to buy back equity from 
investors. 
For example, if a crowdfunding campaign has a $100,000 target 
and yields $200,000 in shareholder equity, then the business may spend 
$100,000 as proposed during the first year, and may only spend the 
other $100,000 after both waiting one year and offering to buy out each 
investor at full value.  If the value of the equity increases during that 
year, then the business will need to make up for the difference if 
investors choose to sell back their shares.  This mechanism essentially 
renders it impossible for an issuer to defraud investors of capital 
contributions that exceed a target offering. 
The SEC may thus utilize escrow accounts to protect capital 
contributions to crowdfunding campaigns even after the conclusion of a 
campaign.  The SEC’s current proposal does not go far enough by 
preventing crowdfunding portals from defrauding entrepreneurs and 
investors during a crowdfunding campaign.184  Investors require 
measures of protection after the conclusion of a crowdfunding campaign 
in order to prevent fraudsters from absconding with capital contributions 
or expending capital contributions in a fashion other than that stated in a 
crowdfunding campaign.  This protection can be achieved by requiring 
crowdfunding portals to release contributions directly to the parties 
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necessary for the planned development or expansion of a company.  
Investor protection may be further bolstered by requiring crowdfunding 
entrepreneurs to maintain contributions that exceed a target offering in 
escrow, as a sort of shareholder insurance fund.  Surely, a venture may 
come to need this extra capital, and this need is balanced with the need 
for investor protection.  Crowdfunding entrepreneurs should therefore 
also be required to wait one year after the conclusion of a campaign and 
offer to buy out investors before spending capital that exceeds a target 
offering. 
CONCLUSION 
Crowdfunding has the capacity to offer an unprecedented source of 
capital to startup companies and small businesses, and merely needs the 
appropriate regulation to protect crowdfunding investors.  This 
protection may be found in escrow.  This Comment therefore urges the 
SEC to require crowdfunding entrepreneurs to (i) place capital 
contributions into escrow and release them directly to the parties 
responsible for the development or expansion of the business, (ii) 
maintain capital contributions that exceed a crowdfunding campaign’s 
target in escrow, to be paid to investors if and when the business fails, 
and (iii) wait one year and offer to buy out investors before expending 
capital that exceeds a target offering.  These uses of escrow may 
adequately protect investors in crowdfunding campaigns, alleviating the 
majority of the criticism of the JOBS Act.  Therefore, as Title III of the 
JOBS Act facilitates the power of crowdfunding, it is now only up to the 
SEC to protect investors from its abuse. 
 
